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Not all police misconduct is the same, and different institutional regimes might 
manage different sorts of misconduct most effectively. This Article surveys the 
universe of police malfeasance from the perspective of an important but 
underappreciated regulatory regime: liability insurance. Nearly all but the very 
largest municipalities buy insurance that covers claims alleging police misconduct. 
In assuming the financial risk of bad police behavior, the insurers become 
motivated to prevent it. Criminal procedure scholarship almost entirely overlooks 
the salutary regulatory influence these insurers may have on police activity. Yet 
insurance is no panacea. Indeed, a principal aim of this Article is to probe the 
limits of the insurance mechanism—the places where the effects of insurance on 
policing are likely weak or even perverse. This exercise points us toward a typology 
of misconduct, along with a corresponding set of plausible approaches for reducing 
the occurrence of each of the types identified. In particular, the Article 
distinguishes varieties of police misconduct based on (1) the dollar-value of the 
legal claims to which they give rise and (2) the length of the delay between when 
the misconduct occurs and when a legal claim is typically filed. The typology 
suggests, among other things, that the insurance regime is a plausible surrogate 
for some governmental regulation of police violence but not, at present, of the sorts 
of misconduct that lead to wrongful convictions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Not all police misconduct is the same, and different institutional 
regimes might combat different sorts of misconduct most effectively. 
This Article surveys the universe of police misconduct from the 
perspective of an important but underappreciated regulatory regime: 
liability insurance. Most small and mid-sized municipalities in the 
United States purchase insurance that covers a range of police 
misconduct claims, from improper service of process to outright assault 
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Abraham, Will Baude, and Joanna Schwartz for helpful conversations and feedback on drafts. 
Scott Henney provided excellent research assistance. The Darelyn A. & Richard C. Reed Memorial 
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and battery, discrimination, and other civil rights violations.1 In 
assuming the financial risk of bad police behavior, the insurers become 
motivated to marshal their substantial resources to prevent it. 
Criminal procedure scholarship almost entirely overlooks the salutary 
“regulatory” influence these insurers may have on police activity, often 
reasoning, mistakenly, as though little or nothing stands between 
judicial opinions or statutes and officer discretion.2 Understanding how 
insurers regulate the police to reduce liability and defense costs is 
crucial in grasping how civil rights lawsuits deter police misconduct. 
Yet insurance is no panacea. Indeed, a principal aim of this Article 
is to probe the limits of the insurance mechanism—the places where 
the effects of insurance on policing are likely weak or even perverse, 
suggesting a need for insurance reform or other, more familiar 
regulatory interventions. These include domains in which moral 
hazard—that is, the propensity of insurance to reduce the insured’s 
incentives to prevent harm—seems most likely to predominate. By 
laying these cases alongside those in which regulation-by-insurance 
appears to function well, I show how thinking about police misconduct 
through the lens of liability insurance points us toward a typology of 
misconduct, along with a corresponding set of plausible approaches for 
reducing the incidence of each of the types identified. My typology 
suggests, among other things, that the insurance regime is a plausible 
surrogate for some governmental regulation of police violence but not—
at least not yet—of the sorts of misconduct that lead to wrongful 
convictions. 
To construct my typology, I distinguish types of police misconduct 
along two dimensions. First, I consider the dollar value of the legal 
claims to which each type of misconduct typically gives rise.3 Low-
 
 1  “Municipality” and “police,” as used here, include both city- and county-level entities and 
law enforcement officers. 
 2  I describe the phenomenon of police “regulation-by-insurance” in detail in other work. See 
John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017), http: //papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733783 [https: //perma.cc /2EC3-
SBHE]. For two of the very few other legal academic papers to touch on insurance, see Joanna C. 
Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 
(2016) [hereinafter Schwartz, How Governments Pay]; Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the 
Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437; see also CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL 115–37 (2009) 
(studying insurance among numerous factors that might influence “legalized accountability” by 
police agencies); Candace McCoy, How Civil Rights Lawsuits Improve American Policing, in 
HOLDING POLICE ACCOUNTABLE 111, 112 (Candace McCoy ed., 2010) (asserting that “insurance 
companies [have] demanded that police improve their policies and practices in adherence to 
constitutional requirements and thus avoid monetary payouts to injured citizens”). 
 3  For a different typology that also sorts civil rights claims according to their dollar value, 
see Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 13 (2008) 
(organizing claims by dollar value and substantive strength). 
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dollar-value claims are poor fodder for civil damages suits and, indeed, 
rarely arise in that posture. Instead, criminal defendants assert these 
claims defensively, to resist prosecution. As a class, these claims pose 
little threat to insurers. Insurers therefore have little incentive to 
regulate the underlying conduct. High-dollar claims, in contrast, create 
sufficient financial incentive to induce potential plaintiffs—and 
plaintiffs’ attorneys—to sue. They give insurers reason to pay 
attention. This does not mean, however, that civil damages suits work 
equally well to deter all types of high-dollar misconduct. A second 
crucial consideration is the length of time between the occurrence of 
misconduct and the filing of a lawsuit. In insurance parlance, a claim of 
police misconduct may have either a “short tail” or a “long tail.”4 Long-
tail claims, I will explain, pose great difficulties for insurers, and there 
are reasons to doubt that insurers are effectively managing the risks 
that give rise to these claims. 
These two criteria—the size of a claim’s expected payout and the 
length of its tail—generate four categories of police misconduct. The 
Article’s structure is accordingly straightforward: In each of the four 
sections that follow, I describe one category of misconduct along with a 
corresponding set of potential solutions. I begin in Part II with high-
dollar, short-tail claims. The archetype here is a claim that alleges the 
use of excessive force. When a police officer employs unlawful force, the 
harm he inflicts is often substantial (high-dollar)—especially where 
death results—and also immediately apparent and actionable (short-
tail). Drawing on original qualitative research of the police liability 
insurance industry, I explain how insurers work to manage the problem 
of police violence and suggest why they may fare better in some regards 
than traditional sources of regulation.5 The potentially provocative 
 
 4  “Long-tail claims are those which are not brought (or if brought, not resolved) for some 
years after the action by the defendant that gives rise to the claim.” Kenneth S. Abraham, 
Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 964 n.69 (1988). In 
practice, legal claims lie on a spectrum, ordered by the length of their tail; the trait is continuous, 
not binary. 
 5  In my initial research for Rappaport, supra note 2, I conducted thirty-three semistructured 
telephone interviews, mostly with members of the industry who were high-ranking officials within 
their respective firms. I located my subjects using a “snowball sampling” technique. See, e.g., JOHN 
LOFLAND ET AL., ANALYZING SOCIAL SETTINGS: A GUIDE TO QUALITATIVE OBSERVATION AND 
ANALYSIS 43 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing “snowball” or “chain-referral” sampling: “a method for 
generating a field sample of individuals possessing the characteristics of interest by asking initial 
contacts if they could name a few individuals with similar characteristics who might agree to be 
interviewed”). My interview subjects were geographically diverse, including representatives of 
firms in every time zone and consultants who travel the country. I followed up on some of these 
interviews with targeted questions via email or a quick additional telephone call, which I did not 
count toward the total thirty-three. I also attended the 2015 annual conferences of the Association 
of Governmental Risk Pools and the International Association of Chiefs of Police. For this 
Article—in particular for the research in Part III—I requested additional telephone interviews 
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implication is that, despite present political pressure to develop public-
law solutions to police violence, limited government resources may be 
better spent fighting other kinds of law enforcement misconduct. To be 
clear, I do not suggest that private regulation by insurers can or should 
substitute for all public regulation of police use of force—only that, if 
public regulatory resources are scarce, we might direct them elsewhere 
and let insurers, where they operate, shoulder some of the load in this 
domain. 
In Part III I turn to high-dollar, long-tail claims. Here I have in 
mind “wrongful conviction” claims filed by individuals who have been 
imprisoned and later exonerated of criminal wrongdoing. The average 
exoneree spends over thirteen years wrongfully incarcerated (long-tail). 
Damages for this sort of harm can be immense (high-dollar). Not all 
wrongful conviction claims allege police misconduct, but many do. And 
when they do, they typically fall within the standard police liability 
policy. Insurers, therefore, have a financial incentive to prevent the 
kinds of misconduct that lead to wrongful convictions. But the long tail 
creates complications that make the risk difficult for insurers to price 
and manage. The relative infrequency of the claims exacerbates these 
challenges. In this context, insurers may actually make things worse 
rather than better by creating (but not controlling) moral hazard. And 
because the rate of exonerations is rising,6 it is reasonable to fear that 
wrongful conviction cases will, before too long, disrupt this corner of the 
liability insurance market. With an eye on this possibility, I suggest 
two sets of reforms—one focused on improving the insurability of the 
underlying risk and the other on alternative, non-insurance-based 
regulatory mechanisms for reducing police malfeasance that leads to 
wrongful convictions. 
The third and fourth categories of police misconduct in my typology 
are largely—though not entirely—outside insurers’ purview. I therefore 
deal with them more quickly. The third category, addressed in Part IV, 
contains low-dollar, short-tail claims. This includes many run-of-the-
mill violations of law, like an investigatory stop unjustified by 
reasonable suspicion or the failure to give Miranda warnings before 
custodial interrogation.7 Although the harm from these interactions 
manifests immediately (short-tail), it is largely non-compensable in the 
eyes of the law (low-dollar). To police these violations, we rely heavily 
 
with the relevant experts who had been most helpful during the first round of interviews; I ended 
up speaking with eight of them. I ceased interviewing new subjects when responses became 
repetitious. 
 6  See sources cited infra note 76. 
 7  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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on criminal defendants to act as private attorneys general, and on the 
occasional suit for injunctive relief. These tools undoubtedly help, but 
more is needed. Drawing on prior work,8 I suggest how we might 
reorient some of our constitutional doctrine to focus defendants’ claims 
on systemic rather than individualized concerns. 
The last category, the topic of Part V, involves low-dollar, long-tail 
claims. It is not immediately obvious what, if anything, belongs in this 
box. But I will make the case that one unique type of claim plausibly 
does, at least some of the time: a claim alleging racial profiling by the 
police. Under extant doctrine, absent a smoking gun, a colorable 
profiling claim must marshal statistical evidence from a broad sample 
of other cases. This creates, in many cases, a delay (i.e., a long tail) 
between the profiling and the potential lawsuit brought to challenge 
it—a delay that distinguishes these claims from mine-run (short-tail) 
constitutional violations. And here too, even a successful plaintiff is 
unlikely to recover much in damages (low-dollar). The unfortunate 
upshot, I think, is that neither civil-damages actions nor criminal 
litigation will work very well to combat racial profiling. Recourse to 
more traditional forms of regulation, like legislation and administrative 
rules, is therefore necessary. Criminal procedure doctrine might be re-
fashioned to encourage this political regulation, I will suggest, but I do 
not think that doctrine alone can save the day. 
 
 
Figure 1 pulls together the strands of the typology: 
 
 High-dollar Low-dollar 











 8  See John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205 
(2015). 
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This model, of course, is only one of myriad schemes we could 
sketch to organize the universe of police misconduct. Those with 
different frameworks or objectives might demarcate categories along 
different dimensions. My approach is useful because it tells us 
something about what solutions are likely to gain traction on each type 
of misconduct. But it is not the only way to think about the topic. 
Two caveats are necessary before proceeding. First, in my 
descriptive case—that is, in determining how to classify different types 
of police misconduct—I take legal doctrine on liability and damages as 
given. This is why I refer to claims as “high-dollar” and “low-dollar” 
rather than “high-value” and “low-value”: I mean to convey nothing 
about the normative value of different claims, only their dollar value 
under legal precedent. Second, I largely obscure the distinction among 
different types of insurance providers. As I explain elsewhere, although 
most municipalities purchase police liability insurance on the market, 
that market is segmented between commercial insurers and 
intergovernmental risk pools.9 And the largest municipalities tend to 
“self-insure.” In large municipalities that take self-insurance seriously, 
and replicate in house much of what market insurers do, the distinction 
between self-insurance and market insurance may be inconsequential. 
But where “self-insurance” really just means “going bare”—which may 
be the typical case10—what I say about the influence of insurance on 
policing likely does not apply, at least not in full. Unfortunately, too 
little is known about municipal self-insurance for police liability to 
permit any confident generalizations, which is why I do not separately 
analyze self-insured and market-insured municipalities. 
My primary aim is to help organize and systematize our thinking 
about how to police the police. Even those who disagree with the 
specifics of my typology, I hope, will take away two thematic points: 
First, “police misconduct” is a capacious and variegated concept, and 
strategies that are necessary or effective to combat one kind of 
 
 9  A risk pool is a nonprofit, mission-driven organization formed by a group of local 
government entities, usually within one state, to finance a risk, typically by pooling or sharing 
that risk. The entities themselves ordinarily own and govern the pool. See Rappaport, supra note 2 
(manuscript at 21–22); see generally Jason E. Doucette, Note, Wading in the Pool: Interlocal 
Cooperation in Municipal Insurance and the State Regulation of Public Entity Risk Sharing 
Pools—A Survey, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 533, 541–42 (2002). 
 10   See, e.g., CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND LEGAL 
ADVISING 25 (2004) (concluding, based on survey results, that “risk management programs are still 
in the infancy stage of being embraced by police agencies”); Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection 
Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055, 1095–1101 (2015) (reviewing evidence that few 
police departments have risk managers); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: 
The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010) (finding 
that the largest police agencies only rarely learn from lawsuits filed against them or their officers). 
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misconduct may not be necessary or effective to fight another. Second, 
one cannot fully understand how our legal system does and can deter 
police misconduct without understanding the role that liability insurers 
play in that endeavor, both for good and ill. 
II. HIGH-DOLLAR, SHORT-TAIL 
Fourth Amendment doctrine prohibits the police from employing 
excessive force in effecting a search or seizure.11 Police who violate this 
stricture may be ordered to pay compensation for personal injuries they 
inflict. Damages, especially in cases involving debilitating injury or 
death, can be quite high; lawsuits stemming from recent high-profile 
officer-involved deaths have settled for around five or six million dollars 
each.12 And the types of injuries these cases involve typically manifest, 
and are actionable, immediately after the misconduct occurs. Those two 
characteristics make use-of-force claims high-dollar, short-tail claims. 
Because the financial stakes can be so high—and because the use 
of excessive force is typically not causally related to the discovery of 
incriminating evidence—use-of-force claims are usually litigated in civil 
suits rather than defensively through suppression motions in criminal 
cases.13 Scholars have raised serious questions about how well civil 
rights suits work to deter police misconduct, and to restrain the use of 
force in particular.14 Some point out, for example, that “excessive force 
 
 11   See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 12   See, e.g., Monica Davey, Chicago Pays $5 Million over Killing of Teenager, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 16, 2015, at A15 (reporting $5 million settlement in death of Laquan McDonald); Richard 
Fausset, Settlement Reached in Shooting by Officer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2015, at A24 (reporting 
$6.5 million settlement in death of Walter Scott); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, University of Cincinnati to 
Pay $5 Million to Family in Killing by Police, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2016, at A16 (reporting $4.85 
million payout in death of Samuel DuBose, which “appears in line with other recent settlements of 
cases involving police officers”); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Baltimore Announces $6.4 Million Settlement 
in the Death of Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2015, at A20 (reporting $6.4 million settlement 
in death of Freddie Gray, which “[l]egal specialists said . . . was in line with settlements for recent 
racially charged police misconduct cases,” including Eric Garner, whose estate settled for $5.9 
million). 
 13  See Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 425 (2012) (finding that “98% of 
excessive force claims are litigated in the civil context”); see also id. at 441 (asserting that criminal 
“courts routinely ignore the use of force in analyzing the legality of an investigative stop”). 
 14   See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN 
POLICING 278–80 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004); Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, 
Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1626–34 (2012); Richard Emery & Ilann 
Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of 
Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587 (2000); Diana Hassel, Living 
a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123, 145 n.106 (1999); Daryl J. Levinson, 
Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 345 (2000); Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement 
Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 283–86 
(1988); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014). But see, e.g., 
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doctrine is extraordinarily abstract.”15 “This uncertainty in legal 
authority,” one commentator argues, “results in a lack of institutional 
guidance and leaves police officers to exercise their own discretion.”16 
I take no issue with the premise that excessive force doctrine is 
abstract and uncertain. But it does not follow that police officers have 
free rein. That conclusion follows only if we ignore other sources of 
police regulation, including (though certainly not limited to) regulation-
by-insurance. The standard police liability policy, however, covers 
excessive-force claims,17 so insurers, not municipalities, typically bear 
the financial risk of police violence. For reasons that I (and others) have 
explained,18 this financial arrangement gives insurers the incentive to 
reduce the frequency of these claims. Indeed, when a prominent risk 
management expert compiled a list of twelve “high risk/critical tasks” 
in policing that warrant the attention of insurers and risk managers, 
use of force topped the list.19 
In Section A below, I describe the regulatory techniques insurers 
use to manage the risk of excessive force. In Section B, I discuss the 
interaction between regulation-by-insurance and more traditional 
modes of public regulation. 
A. How Insurers Regulate the Use of Force 
As I detail in other work, insurers use a variety of tools to try to 
tame police violence, including operational policy development and 
education, training, auditing, and risk-responsive underwriting and 
rating. Insurers invest substantially, for example, in improving covered 
agencies’ policies on the use of force. At the outset of the insurance 
relationship, the insurer typically requests copies of the agency’s 
 
Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional 
Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001). 
 15  Leong, supra note 13, at 446; see also Rachel Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1127 (2008) (calling the doctrine “indeterminate” as well as 
“unprincipled”). 
 16  Leong, supra note 13, at 447. 
 17  See, e.g., Law Enforcement Liability Coverage Form, Nat’l Cas. Co. 5–6, 
http: //euclidps.com/2/wp-content /uploads/2014/05/Law_Enforcement_II_PE_PL_2_0802.pdf 
[https: //perma.cc /E538-LB3C]; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 
U. PENN. L. REV. 653, 656 (2013) (stating that “virtually all property-casualty insurance 
policies . . . are standard-forms used by most insurers”). 
 18  See Rappaport, supra note 2 (manuscript at 16–17); see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. 
Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 
203–05 (2012). 
 19  G. PATRICK GALLAGHER, SUCCESSFUL POLICE RISK MANAGEMENT 53 (2014); see also 
ROBERT J. GIROD, POLICE LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT 163 (2014) (placing “[u]se of force and 
deadly force” atop a list of the “most common ‘actionable conduct’ involving civil rights liability” for 
police). 
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policies.20 The insurer, sometimes contracting with outside attorneys or 
expert consultants, then works with the agency to ensure the policy 
incorporates industry best practices.21 In particular, insurers encourage 
agencies to adopt a “use of force continuum” that specifies the degree of 
force appropriate in various scenarios, and to focus on de-escalating 
tense citizen encounters.22 At least some empirical evidence suggests 
that these policies matter—that a good use-of-force policy helps reduce 
the use of excessive force.23 Throughout the insurance relationship, 
insurers also disseminate written materials and videos designed to 
educate officers (and agency leadership) about the appropriate use of 
force, and some even engage in classroom instruction.24 Many insurers 
also provide financial incentives for agencies to seek accreditation from 
a recognized authority, such as the Commission on Accreditation of 
 
 20   See, e.g., Police Professional Liability Insurance Application, Prof ’l Gov’tal Underwriters, 
Inc. (June 2014), http: //www.pgui.com/App_Content /media/2014%20apps/DRWN%20PPL 
%201010%2006_14%20PGU%20Police%20New%20Bus%20Application. 
pdf [https: //perma.cc /XLA2-36Z3]. 
 21   See, e.g., Trident Risk Points: Operational Policies & Procedures: Use of Force Policy 
Elements, Trident Ins. Servs. (July 2012), https: //www.argolimited.com/media/03C10U7X865H/ 
docs/en_US/9a5e44de9e07465726bcb14894240b67ba9c4565/5PLYTFCP9D5H/Trident-LEL-Use-of-
Force-Policy-Elements-2012.pdf [https: //perma.cc /2VCJ-QJAW]; see also Brandon L. Garrett, 
Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 107 
(explaining that municipal liability “can be premised on a police department’s deviation from 
national police practices”). 
 22  See Focus On: Police—Excessive Use of Force, Munich Re (May 2015), 
https: //www.munichre.com/site/mram-mobile/get /documents_E876514504/mram/asset 
pool.mr_america/PDFs/3_Publications/Research_Spotlight /FOCUS%20ON_Excess-Force.pdf 
[https: //perma.cc /4LW9-T4S6]; Trident Risk Points: Operational Policies & Procedures: Suggested 
Controls for Electronic Stun Weapons, Trident Ins. Servs. (July 2012), https: //www.argo 
limited.com/media/03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/dad1345ec51a64376baf01f33f257328aa66bfd5/G5
V9I05T5956/Trident-LEL-Electronic-Stun-Weapon-Policy-2012.pdf [https: //perma.cc /SA9W-DU 
3M]; Trident Ins. Servs., supra note 21; see also The Use-of-Force Continuum, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Aug. 4, 2009), http: //www.nij.gov/topics/law-
enforcement /officer-safety/use-of-force/Pages/continuum.aspx [perma.cc /L2M3-S8LK]. A recent 
report by the Police Executive Research Forum challenges the continuum’s status as a “best 
practice,” arguing that the continuum can encourage officers to escalate encounters and that 
“there are more effective ways to respond to many threats than through a use-of-force continuum.” 
POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 19–20 (2016). 
 23  See, e.g., Stephen A. Bishopp et al., An Examination of the Effect of a Policy Change on 
Police Use of TASERs, 26 CRIM. J. POL’Y REV. 727 (2015) (electronic stun weapons); James J. Fyfe, 
Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform, 5 JUST. Q. 165 (1988) (firearms). 
 24  See, e.g., Munich Re, supra note 22; Law Enforcement Training Videos, IND. MUN. INS. 
PROGRAM, http: //www.indianamip.com/law_enforcement.html [https: //perma.cc /5JKX-XUEG] (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2015) (listing dozens of training videos covering topics such as “Straight Baton 
Techniques,” “Line Officer Tactical Shotgun,” and “Basic and Power Handcuffing Techniques”); 
Telephone Interview with Consultant A (Aug. 16, 2014) (describing having conducted, on behalf of 
insurers, “hands-on” training on use of force, transportation of prisoners, and other related topics). 
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Law Enforcement Agencies.25 Accreditation requires, among other 
things, continuous compliance with a thirteen-part set of standards on 
the use of force.26 
Importantly, insurers’ efforts extend well beyond the Fourth 
Amendment’s ambit into an array of extra-legal considerations that 
likely affect the frequency and severity of use-of-force events. Consider 
four brief examples. First, insurers educate officers on managing the 
significant stresses of the job.27 Officers who handle stress poorly, the 
evidence suggests, are more likely to act out.28 Second, insurers 
encourage psychological testing of each job applicant “to ensure that 
the applicant is free of mental illness or other defect that would render 
him or her incapable of self-control or appropriate behavior in positions 
 
 25  Risk Management, Liability Insurance, and CALEA Accreditation, CALEA, 
http: //www.calea.org /content /risk-management-liability-insurance-and-calea-accreditation 
[https: //perma.cc /UW7A-3VRU] (last visited Aug. 31, 2015) (maintaining list of “liability insurance 
providers known to CALEA to offer some type of financial incentive to CALEA accredited 
agencies”); Ileana Garcia, Slidell Police Accreditation Keeps the Department’s Insurance Rate Low, 
SLIDELL SENTRY-NEWS, reprinted in CALEA UPDATE MAG., Feb. 2001, http: //www.calea.org /calea-
update-magazine/issue-75/accreditation-works/slidell-police-accreditation-keeps-departments-in 
[https: //perma.cc /H43T-YXMS]. 
 26  See Standards Titles, CALEA, http: //www.calea.org /content /standards-titles 
[perma.cc /D2VM-9ZT8] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015) (listing standards); Law Enforcement Program: 
The Standards, CALEA, http: //www.calea.org /content /law-enforcement-program-standards 
[http://perma.cc /JR8C-3JZM] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015) (requiring compliance with standards); 
Law Enforcement Program: Process, CALEA, http: //www.calea.org /content /law-enforcement-
program-process [http://perma.cc /QJ84-ARP5] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015) (requiring continued 
compliance and reaccreditation). 
 27  E.g., Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D (July 6, 2015). 
 28  See, e.g., DANIEL CRUSE & JESSE RUBIN, DETERMINANTS OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 5 (1973) 
(reporting, based on field study, that “the amount of stress seems to have a good deal of effect on 
the behavior of the officer”); GAIL A. GOOLKASIAN ET AL., COPING WITH POLICE STRESS 10 (1986) 
(reporting findings that stress can negatively affect work performance, though noting studies’ 
limitations); Ronald J. Burke & Aslaug Mikkelsen, Burnout, Job Stress and Attitudes Towards the 
Use of Force by Norwegian Police Officers, 28 POLICING INT’L J. POLICE STRATS. & MGMT. 269, 269–
72 (2005) (summarizing studies finding that chronic work stress causes burnout, which is 
positively and significantly related to the use of force); Nicolien Kop & Martin C. Euwema, 
Occupational Stress and the Use of Force by Dutch Police Officers, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 631 
(2001) (similar); Manny Fernandez, Officer Was Under Stress When He Arrived at Texas Pool 
Party, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2015, at A15 (describing lawyer’s assertion that 
McKinney, Texas, police officer who was videotaped tackling a black teenager in a bikini outside a 
pool party was under stress after responding to two earlier calls involving a suicide and attempted 
suicide); Mark Bond, The Impact of Stress and Fatigue on Law Enforcement Officers and Steps to 
Control It, IN PUBLIC SAFETY (Feb. 24, 2014), http: //inpublicsafety.com/2014/02/the-impact-of-
stress-and-fatigue-on-law-enforcement-officers-and-steps-to-control-it [https://perma.cc/L8ZS-
VBLN] (asserting that officer stress can lead to fatigue, which in turn can lead to misconduct and 
“inappropriate reactions to a situation”). 
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of authority and/or responsibility.”29 Third, insurers increasingly tout 
the harm-reducing potential of body-worn cameras. At a recent 
conference for the Association of Governmental Risk Pools, for example, 
one speaker, addressing a group of municipal insurers, discussed 
studies finding that body-worn cameras had reduced both the use of 
force and citizen complaints about the use of force.30 And fourth, 
insurers have begun efforts to reduce the risk of harm from police 
departments’ use of military equipment. Although I have not seen 
insurers purport to forbid agencies from employing military equipment, 
“police departments with access to military equipment,” one insurance 
newsletter admonishes, must take care to have “appropriate training 
and deployment standards in place.”31 
Insurers also help police departments train their officers by 
supplying materials, funding training programs, or even purchasing 
costly training equipment. Especially relevant here, some insurers 
subsidize expensive “virtual reality” training on use-of-force 
 
 29   See, e.g., Trident Risk Points: Operational Policies & Procedures: Law Enforcement 
Employment Hiring Policy, Trident Ins. Servs. (Sept. 2012), https: //www.argolimited.com/ 
media/03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/74ab995451582b436242abc67f5252a8f9e34329/795717IY6X5I/
Trident-Employment-Hiring-Program-2012.pdf [https: //perma.cc /2P9J-PQAM]. The research on 
the benefits of psychological screening of officer candidates is mixed. See, e.g., Michael G. Aamodt, 
Predicting Law Enforcement Officer Performance with Personality Inventories, in PERSONALITY 
ASSESSMENT IN POLICE PSYCHOLOGY 229, 238–40 (Peter A. Weiss ed., 2010) (reporting, based on 
meta-analysis of 200 studies, that some aspects of certain personality tests do a reasonable job of 
predicting officer performance, including disciplinary problems, but many do not); Robert E. 
Cochrane et al., Psychological Testing and the Selection of Police Officers: A National Survey, 30 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 511, 515 (2003) (collecting sources that have “demonstrated the usefulness 
of personality measures in predicting job performance” of police officers); Candice Bernd, 
Evaluating Police Psychology: Who Passes the Test?, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 20, 2015, 9:25 AM), 
http: //www.truth-out.org /news/item/29191-evaluating-police-psychology-who-passes-the-test 
[http://perma.cc /YXM7-TFD6] (asserting that, “[w]hen departments forgo psychological screenings, 
the result is often violence,” but also highlighting the lack of standardization and sophistication of 
screening exams). 
 30  Ken Wallentine, Vice President & Senior Legal Advisor, Lexipol, Body Worn Cameras: Risk 
and Reward (Oct. 6, 2015). Wallentine cited studies from Rialto, California, and Denver, Colorado. 
See Barak Ariel et al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ 
Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 509 
(2015); Cole Zercoe, Body Camera Study: Denver Police See Drop in Arrests, UOF Complaints, 
POLICEONE (Sept. 4, 2015), http: //www.policeone.com/police-products/body-cameras/articles/ 
9485301-Body-camera-study-Denver-police-see-drop-in-arrests-UOF-complaints/ [https: //perma. 
cc /ZD3X-QETH]; see also Munich Re, supra note 22 (“[P]olice departments are encouraged to 
purchase body cameras, provide training and set standards for their use.”); The Effect of Body 
Worn Cameras & Police Use of Force, Trident Ins. Servs. (Feb. 2015), https: //www. 
argolimited.com/media/03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/d94acf91189467168892daca4ba90de76bc8a26
3/D6L33YO488Y0/Your_Risk_Control_Resource_-_Feb15.pdf [https: //perma.cc /33HQ-LVYG] 
(“[B]ody-worn cameras appear to be a potentially valuable tool in reducing police use of force and 
related incidents.”). 
 31  Munich Re, supra note 22. 
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simulators.32 These “[m]odern computerized use of force simulators 
expose police officers to highly realistic and interactive scenarios 
whereby they can learn appropriate responses using the full range of 
use of force options available.”33 Rather than simply honing 
marksmanship, these tools teach officers to apply their skills 
appropriately under “field-compatible” conditions.34 In empirical 
research, such “simulation training has been demonstrated to increase 
the number of preventative actions taken by police officers, enhance 
shooting accuracy, reduce the number of shots fired to achieve an 
objective, increase the degree to which police officers use cover, and 
decrease the number of unjustified shootings.”35 
Insurers also facilitate training about how not to use force. Another 
presentation at the Association of Governmental Risk Pools conference 
focused on using mediation and alternative dispute resolution 
techniques on the policing beat.36 Many insurers offer courses on verbal 
de-escalation techniques, subsidized for policyholders.37 And in a 
newsletter recommending measures to reduce the use of force, one 
insurer advises that “a comprehensive training program should be 
conducted by outside personnel and focus on defusing incidents.”38 
One ubiquitous challenge in policing the police is ensuring 
continued compliance with departmental policies. Adopting good 
policies and procedures, that is, and training on those policies when 
officers join the force, may get a department off to the right start, but 
 
 32   See, e.g., Law Enforcement Training Solutions, MEGGITT TRAINING SYS., 
http: //meggitttrainingsystems.com/Law-Enforcement [https: //perma.cc /2M6B-4F76] (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2015); VIRTRA, http: //www.virtra.com/ [https: //perma.cc /3DKA-Q4ZK] (last visited Aug. 
31, 2015); MILO RANGE, http: //www.milorange.com [https: //perma.cc /UQ35-KHNN] (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2015). 
 33  CRAIG BENNELL & NATALIE J. JONES, CAN. POLICE RESEARCH CTR., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
USE OF FORCE SIMULATION TRAINING 8 (2005), http: //www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cnmcs-
plcng /cn000032136920-eng.pdf [https: //perma.cc /P35H-NGY6]. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. at 6; see also Jennifer Armstrong et al., Monitoring the Impact of Scenario-Based Use-
of-Force Simulations on Police Heart Rate: Evaluating the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Skills 
Refresher Program, 15 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 51 (2014); Evelyn-Rose Saus et al., The Effect of 
Brief Situational Awareness Training in a Police Shooting Simulator: An Experimental Study, 18 
MILITARY PSYCH. S3 (2006). 
 36  William Micklus, Assoc. Dir., Upper Midwest Cmty. Policing Inst. & Jeffrey Range, Senior 
Practitioner, Resologics, Dispute Resolution: Skills Training for Law Enforcement (Oct. 7, 2015). 
 37   See, e.g., Training Calendar, WASH. CITIES INS. AUTH., http: //www.wciapool.org /education-
training /calendar [https: //perma.cc /6QWJ-F4NE] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015); Featured Training 
Notice, CITIES & VILLS. MUT. INS. CO. (Mar. 26, 2015), http: //www.cvmic.com/featured-training-
notice/ [https: //perma.cc /DQ6E-NEJP]. 
 38  Munich Re, supra note 22. 
369]              A TYPOLOGY OF POLICE MISCONDUCT      381 
 
proper maintenance is essential.39 Accredited agencies must 
demonstrate their continued compliance with accreditation standards, 
though the extent of those obligations is unclear.40 Insurers address the 
compliance problem by auditing agencies on a regular basis—anywhere 
from semi-annually to once every three years, according to the experts I 
interviewed.41 Insurers send auditors or consultants to visit insured 
agencies, sometimes for two- or three-day stints. The auditors review 
police reports, internal affairs files, and other liability-related 
documentation.42 They may go out in the field with the chief or other 
officers.43 Insurers also use data on claims involving the use of force to 
identify troubled agencies and problem officers.44 Agencies that make 
an insurer’s “watch list” are audited more frequently and intensely. 
These auditing practices seem to capture at least the spirit of the “early 
warning systems” many policing experts have praised.45 
None of what I’ve said so far, importantly, addresses whether 
municipalities listen to their insurers—whether they actually do what 
insurers say they ought to do. The answer, generally speaking, seems to 
 
 39   See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004) (discussing the separation between formal departmental policies and 
informal de facto norms); Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. 
Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 45 
(2003) (disaggregating “primary compliance,” which “involves the development of a formal policy 
on a particular aspect of police operations”; “secondary compliance,” which “involves evidence that 
the department has incorporated the policy into training and supervision”; and “operational 
compliance,” which “involves evidence that officers comply with the policy in their routine 
activities”). 
 40  See supra note 24. 
 41  Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A (July 20, 2015) (every three years); 
Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A (Sept. 2, 2014) (annual); Telephone Interview with Risk 
Pool B (Sept. 2, 2014) (semi-annual). Some insurers require online updates from agencies in 
between audits or encourage self-audits in addition. Telephone Interview with Risk Pool B, supra 
(requires periodic online updates); Trident Risk Points: Operational Policies & Procedures: 
Monitoring Compliance with Law Enforcement Manual, Trident Ins. Servs. (July 2012), 
https: //www.argolimited.com/media/03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/1ff185e22af3a5c38781aa76ee68fc
ccad4ee5e6/IQJ40V3Z1A83/Trident-LEL-Compliance_with-Manual-2012.pdf 
[https: //perma.cc /G5FS-XPR8] (providing guidelines for self-audits). 
 42  Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with Consultant 
B (Aug. 27, 2014). 
 43  Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with Risk Pool 
C (June 29, 2015). 
 44  Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with 
Commercial Insurer D (Oct. 13, 2015); Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 41; 
Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 27; Telephone Interview with Consultant A, 
supra note 24; Telephone Interview with Consultant C (Aug. 20, 2014). 
 45  See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 137–77 (2d ed. 2014); Armacost, supra note 39, at 459–60; SAMUEL WALKER ET 
AL., RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM OFFICER: A NATIONAL STUDY OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS 2.4–
2.6 (2000), https: //www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/184510.pdf [https: //perma.cc /EXE6-X4TN]. 
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be yes.46 Insurers have two principal ways to induce agencies to 
cooperate with loss-prevention initiatives: they can raise rates and 
threaten to terminate coverage. Insurers charge more to agencies that 
frequently tender claims, just like your auto insurer does to you; and 
they lower prices for agencies that demonstrate commitment to loss 
prevention, such as by obtaining accreditation. Some also adjust rates 
based on the existence and quality of various departmental policies. 
And when rate adjustments are not enough to make municipalities 
listen, insurers can terminate coverage, or credibly threaten to do so. At 
least partly in response to these incentives, police agencies adopt or 
amend departmental policies on important subjects like the use of force 
and firearms. They change the way they train their officers. And they 
even fire problem officers, all the way up to the chief.47 In extreme 
cases, municipalities have shuttered police departments after their 
insurers pulled coverage.48 
According to one expert with several decades of experience in the 
industry, municipal liability insurers are more heavily focused on 
policing now than at any time since the early 1990s. The Rodney King 
beating in 1991, this expert said, had “ripple effects” throughout the 
industry. Insurers sought to ensure that police agencies had adequate 
policies and procedures on the use of force and related subjects. After a 
while, though, attention waned as other sources of municipal liability 
captured insurers’ interest. Now, after the recent wave of highly 
publicized officer-involved deaths, insurers find themselves “back in the 
soup.” Many insurers, moreover, now recognize that the problems with 
 
 46  For far more detail on this topic, see Rappaport, supra note 2 (manuscript at 50–55, 
57–59). 
 47   See, e.g., Alex Green, Niota Officials Tied to Beating Fired; They Say Insurance Company 
Forced the Action, TIMES FREE PRESS (Chattanooga), Aug. 24, 2013 (quoting mayor’s report that 
city’s coverage would have been dropped if two officers involved in misconduct had been allowed 
back on duty); Rutledge Mayor “Had No Choice” in Firing: Police Chief Refused to Resign; City at 
Risk of Losing Insurance, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Mar. 23, 2010 (reporting mayor’s assertion 
he “‘had no choice’” but to fire a police chief accused of misconduct because “the city was at risk of 
losing its liability insurance” if the chief remained (quoting Mayor Danny Turley)); see also Rob 
Karwath, Calumet City Will Lose Police Liability Insurance, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1988 (reporting 
council member’s comment that city’s insurance cancellation was “the final argument for the 
mayor to pick a new police chief from outside the department” when the interim chief retired). 
 48   See, e.g., Schwartz, How Governments Pay, supra note 2, at 1190–91 & nn.165–71 
(collecting four examples of police departments that closed due to premium increases or 
termination of coverage); see also George J. Church, Sorry, Your Policy Is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 
1986, at 16, 17, 18 (reporting that police patrols were suspended in two towns and five counties 
closed their jails due to lack of coverage); Tyler Jett, City of Niota, Tenn., Shutting Down. Again., 
TIMES FREE PRESS (Chattanooga), June 19, 2013 (reporting that the city’s “police department is 
closed” after its insurer pulled coverage); cf. Liability Insurance in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
1986, at A26 (reporting that “police in West Orange, N.J., had to stop patrolling in cars they could 
no longer insure”). 
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police go “beyond policies and procedures”; in order to reduce 
misconduct, insurers—and we, as a society—“need to find the root 
cause.”49 
B. Private Regulation, Public Regulation 
Meanwhile, politicians, too, have considered how to respond to 
recent police violence. According to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, in the year 2015 alone, twenty-four state legislatures 
considered bills to address investigatory procedures for officer-involved 
deaths.50 Measures in thirteen of those states concern the appointment 
of special prosecutors. Seven states are evaluating bills about the 
collection of data and tracking of statistics in officer-involved deaths. 
Other related bills deal with chokeholds, body-worn cameras, the 
public’s ability to film law enforcement, and military equipment. 
These are positive developments that I do not wish to disparage in 
any way. They may be crucial for regulating self-insured departments 
that do not take loss prevention seriously, which likely describes many 
major metropolitan agencies, including some that are (rightly) under 
the microscope today. And they may serve retributive and expressive 
purposes necessary to rebuild community trust in the police. Yet, from 
a regulatory (i.e., deterrence) perspective, I am skeptical about their 
capacity to improve meaningfully upon what insurers are already 
doing.51 In fact, insurers’ private regulation may well be more nuanced, 
nimble, and data-driven than what state legislatures can accomplish.52 
To the extent that legislative resources (or the political support 
necessary to marshal those resources) are scarce, one can make a case 
 
 49  Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer B (July 24, 2015); see also Telephone 
Interview with Commercial Broker A (July 22, 2015) (agreeing that underwriters have become 
more concerned with police liability since Ferguson); Roberto Ceniceros, Scandals Can Influence 
Police Liability Coverage, BUS. INS. (June 5, 2000), http: //www.businessinsurance.com/article/ 
20000604/ISSUE01/10002637/scandals-can-influence-police-liability-coverage [https: //perma.cc / 
26HY-XAF5] (discussing effect of police scandals on rates and coverage nationwide); Zusha 
Elinson & Dan Frosch, Cost of Police-Misconduct Cases Soars in Big U.S. Cities; Data Show Rising 
Payouts for Police-Misconduct Settlements and Court Judgments, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2015 
(“[I]nsurers and lawyers who defend police say current scrutiny of law enforcement is broadly 
affecting the resolution of lawsuits.”). 
 50  Law Enforcement Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 29, 2015), 
http: //www.ncsl.org /research/civil-and-criminal-justice/law-enforcement.aspx 
[https: //perma.cc /EP3X-EKD5]. 
 51  The prospect of criminal punishment may discourage some egregious misconduct, but I am 
inclined to agree with Paul Chevigny that “[c]riminal law is . . . not a system of ‘discipline’ for 
police misconduct; it defines the outer limits of what is permissible in society” and is at best a 
“patchy deterrent.” See PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE 98–101 (1995). 
 52  See generally Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 18. 
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that they should be spent where the private regulatory system is 
absent or fails to function, rather than where it seems to function best. 
Instead, we might devote public efforts to supporting the 
regulatory function insurers provide. We could consider, for example, 
mandating market insurance for municipalities that cannot 
demonstrate a good-faith commitment to loss prevention. We might 
also examine whether there are legal threats that cause insurers to shy 
away from more intensive regulation. Although, as I mentioned above, 
some insurers have successfully pressured agencies to terminate 
problem officers, others I interviewed expressed fear that doing so 
might subject them to liability, or at least to legal action, under 
employment, labor, or contract law.53 If this fear is well founded, it may 
be worth creating narrow safe harbors from liability for insurers to 
remove a disincentive to socially beneficial risk regulation.54 
III. HIGH-DOLLAR, LONG-TAIL 
An individual who is wrongfully convicted, incarcerated, and later 
exonerated and freed can generally sue for damages for the time spent 
unjustly imprisoned.55 Successful plaintiffs—by one estimate, twenty-
eight percent of all those exonerated by DNA who sue56—have in some 
cases obtained judgments and settlements upwards of one million 
dollars for each year of incarceration.57 Multiply that by the thirteen 
years the average exoneree spends in prison,58 and it’s not hard to see 
 
 53   See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 27. 
 54  Cf. Kyle D. Logue, Encouraging Insurers to Regulate: The Role (If Any) for Tort Law, 5 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 1355 (2015). 
 55  “Generally” is a meaningful modifier here. See Garrett, supra note 21, at 54; see generally 
Michael Avery, Obstacles to Litigating Civil Claims for Wrongful Conviction: An Overview, 18 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 439 (2009). 
 56  See INNOCENCE PROJECT, MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME: WHAT THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 
ENDURE AND HOW TO PROVIDE FAIR COMPENSATION 4, http: //www.innocenceproject.org /files/ 
imported/innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf [https: //perma.cc /CS7U-MJMW]. 
 57  Garrett, supra note 21, at 43 n.30, 44 n.32 (collecting cases); see also Mark Iris, Your Tax 
Dollars at Work! Chicago Police Lawsuit Payments: How Much, and for What?, 2 VA. J. CRIM. L. 
25, 44–45 (2014) (reporting average payouts of $2.4 and 3.2 million per case for Chicago police 
defendants in wrongful conviction cases between 2006 and 2012 in federal and state courts, 
respectively). Compensation is all over the map, however, and in some cases is grievously lacking. 
Compare Martin G. Hacala, Insights: Wrongful Convictions: What Governmental Risk Pools, and 
the Public Entities They Insure, Need to Know, GENESIS, at 5 (May 2012), https: //www.genesis 
insurance.com/assets/pdfs/In%20the%20News/Insights20125-2.pdf [https: //perma.cc /P9KB-GNT4] 
(“[D]amages awarded in wrongful conviction claims vary significantly. Indeed, it isn’t unheard of 
for the wrongfully convicted to recover nothing or a trivial amount.”), with id. at 6 (collecting cases 
sustaining damages in the millions). 
 58  Hacala, supra note 57, at 3. A prisoner may not sue for wrongful conviction until his 
conviction is reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 
(1994). 
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how enormous the liability risk can be. Police misconduct, my focus 
here, contributes to many, though not all, of these wrongful 
convictions.59 The leading police-related causes of wrongful conviction 
include erroneous eyewitness identification, faulty forensic evidence, 
false informant testimony, and false or coerced confessions.60 Where 
police are implicated, police liability policies generally cover the 
claims.61 
One might think, therefore, that insurers would be highly attuned 
to the risk of wrongful convictions and, as with the use of force, would 
closely regulate the agencies they insure in an effort to reduce that 
risk. But the long tail of most wrongful conviction claims—the delay 
between when the wrongful conduct occurred and when the claim is 
filed—makes the claims an insurance nightmare.62 Section A briefly 
explains why. Section B discusses potential responses to the difficulties 
insurers face. 
A. The Challenges of Insuring Long-Tail Risks 
Insurance theory suggests several reasons that long-tail risks may 
strain insurers’ regulatory capabilities. The problem worsens when, as 
here, the risks are also low in probability but highly consequential. 
Sections 1 and 2 address these respective points. Section 3 reports 
qualitative empirical findings that tend to substantiate the challenges 
theory predicts. 
1. The basic theory. 
A long tail of liability creates at least three distinct problems for 
insurers. First, the long tail heightens the degree of correlation (i.e., 
statistical dependence) among the covered risks. All liability insurance, 
 
 59  See Garrett, supra note 21, at 42 (“[I]n a surprisingly large number of cases, wrongful 
convictions were caused by police misconduct.”); see generally Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as 
a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2013). According to a 1999 study, the 
figure is fifty percent. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 246 (2003). Other common causes of 
wrongful convictions include prosecutorial misconduct and deficient defense counsel. See, e.g., 
JAMES R. ACKER & ALLISON D. REDLICH, WRONGFUL CONVICTION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 
(2011); JON B. GOULD ET AL., PREDICTING ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS: A SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH 
TO MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (2012). 
 60  Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 75–91 (2008); see generally 
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011). 
 61   See, e.g., Nat’l Cas. Co., supra note 17, at 5–6 (covering “[f]alse arrest, detention or 
imprisonment, or malicious prosecution” and “[v]iolation of civil rights protected under 42 USC 
1981 et sequential or State Law”); Telephone Interview No. 2 with Risk Pool A (Oct. 5, 2015); 
Telephone Interview No. 2 with Risk Pool B (Oct. 5, 2015). 
 62  See Hacala, supra note 57, at 2 (“[E]xoneration . . . presents a significant legal and 
financial challenge for public entities and the [entities] that insure them.”). 
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at least in theory, involves problems of correlated risk “if the rules 
under which liability is determined and damages are assessed change 
over the life of the insurance contracts.”63 In many insurance contexts, 
the law is unlikely to change much, but the delay entailed by long-tail 
risks exposes insurers to “judicial, legislative, and economic changes 
that commonly influence the ultimate determination of awards.”64 “For 
example, unexpected inflation over the runoff period could commonly 
increase the ultimate payoff on all outstanding claims beyond the 
amount reserved by the insurer. Similarly, a new judicial precedent or 
legislation can expand the area of liability, ease the burden of proof for 
future plaintiffs, or cause a common upward shift in the value of 
awards on all outstanding claims.”65 Even changes in prevailing 
attitudes toward the police and the criminal justice system can have a 
substantial (and correlated) effect.66 All this matters because, the more 
that risks are correlated, the less insurers can reduce the risks by 
aggregating them, which is one of their defining functions.67 This is 
why losses from risks that affect many policyholders simultaneously, 
like earthquakes, are commonly excluded from homeowners and 
renters policies.68 
Second, the long tail can create incentives that lead insurers to 
regulate too little. “Because of turnover, risk managers may have a 
much shorter time horizon than the firm. Current decisionmakers may 
reap no reward within the organization for reducing remote risks and 
may even be penalized for expending current funds for doing so.”69 As a 
result, insurance managers may “externalize to the future,” maximizing 
their short-term results at the expense of long-term interests.70 This 
“coordination-across-time problem” is another reason that “latent 
harms . . . can put insurers in a poor regulatory position.”71 
 
 63  Neil A. Doherty & Georges Dionne, Insurance with Undiversifiable Risk: Contract 
Structure and Organizational Form of Insurance Firms, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 187, 188 (1993). 
 64  Id. at 198. 
 65  Id. For an excellent clarifying discussion that classifies types of “liability developments 
risk,” see Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 128 (2004). 
 66  See Ceniceros, supra note 49. 
 67  See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 83–85 
(2013); S. HUN SEOG, THE ECONOMICS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 47 (2010). 
 68  See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 18, at 215. 
 69  Martin T. Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and Catastrophic Environmental Risk, 
55 J. RISK & INS. 75, 83 (1988). 
 70  KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 48 (1986); cf. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 
18, at 230 (“Some of the risks that insurers regulate materialize into harms far into the future, 
which means that insurers’ efforts to reduce such risks will largely benefit future insurers.”). 
 71  Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 18, at 230. 
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Third, and maybe most important, the long tail creates uncertainty 
about the number and magnitude of wrongful conviction claims 
insurers should expect. Here I mean to reference the distinction 
insurance theorists draw between risk and uncertainty. Risk refers to 
“a probability that can be estimated, whether on the basis of observed 
frequency or of theory.”72 Uncertainty refers to “a probability that 
cannot be estimated.”73 Risk, put differently, “is something that you can 
put a price on,” whereas uncertainty “is risk that is hard to measure.”74 
The long delay between the collection of premiums and the processing 
of claims complicates measurement of a long-tail risk. “Even if the 
frequency and severity of future claims were predictable in current 
dollars, economic and legal inflation over such a long period would 
make assessment of ultimate financial exposure extremely 
speculative.”75 
2. The additional difficulty of low-probability, high-consequence 
risks. 
It seems, moreover, that the frequency of future wrongful 
conviction claims is not particularly amenable to prediction, largely 
because it is too low.76 A wrongful conviction claim is what is called a 
low-probability, high-consequence event, a phenomenon that 
consistently eludes human predictive capacity: “Much of the time, 
human beings ignore low-probability, high-consequence events, giving 
them far less attention than they deserve. But when people experience 
or see a relevant bad outcome, their concern frequently becomes 
 
 72  RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE 171–72 (2004). 
 73  Id. at 172. 
 74  NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE 29 (2012). The distinction traces back to FRANK 
H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 197–232 (1921); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-
CASE SCENARIOS 147 (2007) (describing uncertainty as a situation “where outcomes can be 
identified but no probabilities can be assigned” and risk as “where outcomes can be identified and 
probabilities assigned to various outcomes”); id. at 159–62 (defending the distinction). But see 
MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 282 (1976) (challenging the distinction’s validity). 
 75  ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 47. 
 76  SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012, at 3 (2012), http: //www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/ 
Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf [https: //perma.cc /97NR-SVK7] (“[E]ven 
2,000 exonerations over 23 years is a tiny number in a country with 2.3 million people in prisons 
and jails.”). The rate of exonerations does seem to be increasing, however. See, e.g., NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, THE FIRST 1,600 EXONERATIONS 5 (2015), http: //www.law.umich.edu/ 
special/exoneration/Documents/1600_Exonerations.pdf [https: //perma.cc /AT36-S4WG]; Sam R. 
Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
523, 527 (2005). Perhaps this is not surprising, given that the errors that lead to wrongful 
convictions are typically systemic, not idiosyncratic. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 60, at 274; 
Jennifer E. Laurin, Still Convicting the Innocent, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 1475 (2012) (book review). 
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exaggerated.”77 This may be why one insurer asserts that “[t]here is no 
way for [an insurer] to predict the likelihood or volume of exonerations 
and civil claims.”78 
All this uncertainty gums up the insurance machine, for insurance 
deals far better with risk than uncertainty. Insurers faced with 
uncertainty cannot accurately price coverage. “[D]espite high levels of 
expertise and strong incentives to make logical decisions, [insurance 
managers] make errors with respect to situations where there is 
uncertainty or ambiguous information regarding the low probability 
risks they face. When insurers have limited data and limited past 
experience with extreme events, there is a tendency for them to engage 
in intuitive thinking when determining what coverage to offer against 
specific risks and how much to charge.”79 For this reason, “[i]t would 
not be unusual for a governmental risk pool to have little or no 
remaining [incurred but not reported] reserves in the accident year in 
which the trigger date falls,” i.e., the year in which a wrongful arrest or 
conviction occurred.80 “This means a single significant claim could put 
significant pressure on the pool’s surplus.”81 
Nor can insurers be confident about what loss-prevention measures 
they can reasonably insist upon. As Kenneth Abraham explains, “the 
threat of uncertain liability can promote optimal safety levels only by 
mere chance, because risk-optimizing behavior requires cost-benefit 
calculations that are necessarily impossible in the face of great 
 
 77  SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 21–24. There is a substantial related literature finding that 
individuals purchase too little insurance against low-probability events. See, e.g., Mark J. Browne, 
Behavioral Bias and the Demand for Bicycle and Flood Insurance, 50 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141 
(2015); Philip T. Ganderton et al., Buying Insurance for Disaster-Type Risks: Experimental 
Evidence, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 271 (2000); Paul Schoemaker & Howard C. Kunreuther, An 
Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions, 46 J. RISK & INS. 603 (1979); Paul Slovic et al., 
Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS. 
237 (1977); see also Gary H. McClelland et al., Insurance for Low-Probability Hazards: A Bimodal 
Response to Unlikely Events, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95 (1993) (finding extreme bimodality in 
willingness to pay). But see Susan K. Laury et al., Insurance Decisions for Low-Probability Losses, 
39 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17 (2009). 
 78  Hacala, supra note 57, at 9. 
 79  Howard C. Kunreuther & Mark V. Pauly, Behavioral Economics and Insurance: Principles 
and Solutions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW 15, 21–23 (Daniel 
Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015); see KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 67, at 7 
(“Insurers . . . misunderstand how to predict rare events and therefore sometimes make decisions 
that appear to ignore risks altogether. Alternatively, they sometimes fixate on the magnitude of 
recent losses and claims without weighting these figures by an estimate of the likelihood of 
another catastrophe occurring.”); Katzman, supra note 69, at 85. This is not to say there are no 
methods to predict extreme events.  See, e.g., Robert Lund, Revenge of the White Swan, 61 AM. 
STATISTICIAN 189, 190 (2007) (discussing extreme value theory, “the statistician’s bible for 
quantifying rare events”). 
 80  Hacala, supra note 57, at 9. 
 81  Id. 
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uncertainty.”82 And any attempt by insurers to adjust to new 
understandings of the scope of liability—through, say, raising 
premiums or crafting an exclusion—cannot have impact for years, 
when claims stemming from today’s conduct will arise. It can only cut 
future losses.83 As for the conduct covered long ago, which may give rise 
to a claim tomorrow, insurers cannot but concede the familiar truism, 
that “the past is the past.”84 
3. The empirics. 
My own empirical research, conducted for this Article, largely 
confirms what theory predicts. Exploiting contacts made while 
conducting a larger, related empirical project, I interviewed eight 
insurers—including both commercial firms and intergovernmental risk 
pools—about how they price and manage the risk of wrongful 
convictions.85 For the most part, they don’t. Some had not even given 
the issue any thought.86 The insurers confirmed that wrongful 
conviction suits are covered when law enforcement is implicated, 
absent some particular exclusion. But none of them attempts to 
determine the share of the premium attributable to wrongful conviction 
coverage. Nor, for the most part, do they engage in any loss prevention 
specifically designed to reduce the incidence of wrongful convictions. 
These insurers seemed simply to ignore the risk.87 
 
 82  Abraham, supra note 4, at 944; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 51 (“[T]he capacity of 
any system of liability to promote optimal deterrence depends on how predictable liability is.”). 
Compare Richard Lempert, Low Probability/High Consequence Events: Dilemmas of Damage 
Compensation, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 385 (2009) (listing reasons, including “psychological 
denial,” that “make it almost inevitable that insufficient precaution will be taken” against low-
probability, high-consequence events), and Katzman, supra note 69, at 83 (“Given a ‘finite 
reservoir of concern,’ risk managers may pay little attention to low-probability risks, no matter 
how severe the potential consequences.”), with Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive 
and Normative Implications for Tort and Contract Law, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 125, 126 (2004) 
(showing that a “person who discounts remote risks might take too much care, rather than too 
little”). 
 83  ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 965. 
 84  Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer C (Oct. 26, 2015). I do not mean to suggest 
there is nothing insurers can do to improve their position vis-à-vis claims arising from actions 
taken years ago. Some insurers have gone back to shore up their reserves for past coverage years. 
Id. But this does not reduce the likelihood that harm from past actions will manifest. 
 85  For more on methodology, see supra note 5. 
 86   See, e.g., Telephone Interview No. 2 with Risk Pool A, supra note 61 (explaining that the 
pool had never priced the risk or looked at specific loss-prevention measures because it had never 
considered the risk, which it believed more relevant in big cities and in the South). 
 87  Id.; Telephone Interview No. 2 with Commercial Insurer B (Oct. 1, 2015) (speculating that 
wrongful convictions are not a significant issue for pools his company reinsures because the pools’ 
members are “puny munis”). But see Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 
44 (reinsures small pools that have encountered wrongful conviction claims). 
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A few insurers emphasized that, although they take no steps to 
address wrongful conviction risks in particular, their general 
underwriting and loss-prevention practices should sufficiently control 
the exposure. One stressed the importance of accreditation by agencies 
that impose continuing education standards and check for well-
maintained policies and procedures.88 Another said his pool educates 
the police about their obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence and 
audits agencies’ evidence rooms for conformance with best practices.89 
That pool also scrutinizes the integrity of agency personnel, reviewing 
the veracity of employment applications and performance during 
probationary employment periods.90 The same expert added that 
underwriters will notice a department that’s generally sloppy, based on 
responses to questionnaires about best practices.91 But, he added, 
tellingly, as for how such measures actually affect (and reflect) the risk 
of wrongful conviction, “There’s no science behind it.”92 
My research therefore suggests that, to the extent insurers attempt 
to price the risk of wrongful convictions, their efforts are crude, at best. 
This means that, in this context—in contrast to what I said in Part II 
about the use of force—insurers may be making matters worse rather 
than better. “Failure to risk-rate premiums,” it is well known, can 
“create[ ] moral hazard.”93 Depressed prices, assuming that’s what we 
have, weaken incentives for loss prevention and send inaccurate signals 
to both insured municipalities and the public about the risk and cost of 
wrongful convictions.94 
 
 88  Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 44. 
 89  Telephone Interview No. 2 with Risk Pool C (Sept. 28, 2015); see also Telephone Interview 
with Risk Pool E (Oct. 7, 2015) (reporting that wrongful convictions are “just coming onto the 
radar,” and that an industry conference, last year for the first time, included a session on wrongful 
convictions, focusing on the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence). 
 90  Telephone Interview No. 2 with Risk Pool C, supra note 89; see also Telephone Interview 
No. 2 with Risk Pool A, supra note 61 (stressing “integrity first in personal and professional 
behavior”). 
 91  Telephone Interview No. 2 with Risk Pool C, supra note 89. 
 92  Id. This expert’s admission calls to mind the terrorism context, in which insurers have 
been similarly unable to gauge risk levels accurately. See Michelle E. Boardman, Known 
Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 815–20 (2005) (arguing that 
terrorism risk is incalculable largely because the data are too scarce and disparate; that insurers 
are “guessing” on prices, which vary wildly; and that pricing has “not been very scientific” because 
“underwriters are relying on their experience and instincts”). 
 93  Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 79, at 24. 
 94  See Boardman, supra note 92, at 836–42 (discussing the efficiency costs of inaccurate 
pricing, which sends inaccurate signals about the risk and cost of harm). In theory, insurers could 
be (unwittingly) charging too much, rather than too little, to cover the risk of wrongful convictions, 
leading insured municipalities to overinvest in loss prevention. I think this is unlikely, however, 
and I heard no hint of it during any of my conversations with industry experts. 
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What is more, if experience in analogous domains is any guide, 
insurers’ ostrich-like approach to covering wrongful conviction claims 
may mask fragility and volatility in this corner of the market, which a 
run of wrongful convictions may lay bare. “After a severe loss, insurers 
may withdraw from covering this risk because they focus on the losses 
from a worst-case scenario without adequately reflecting on the [low] 
likelihood of this event occurring in the future.”95 This is what 
happened with coverage against terrorism risks. “[P]rior to 9/11, 
insurance losses from terrorism were viewed as so improbable that the 
risk was not explicitly mentioned or priced in any standard policy.”96 
But “[f]ollowing the 9/11 attacks, most insurance swung to the other 
extreme.”97 The same thing occurred with pollution insurance.98 The 
few insurers I spoke to who do have an eye on the issue agreed that 
wrongful conviction coverage could meet a similar fate, especially if the 
present “soft” market firms up.99 
B. Responding to Insurance Shortfalls 
If what I have said is correct, a two-headed reform agenda is in 
order. First, we should seek ways to shore up the insurance function, 
both to improve insurers’ capacity to regulate the risk of wrongful 
convictions and to avert the type of insurance crises we experienced 
with terrorism and pollution coverage. If changes are required, better 
to implement them in a proactive, orderly fashion than to walk 
headlong into a disruptive, destabilizing felt emergency. Second, 
cognizant that insurers do not appear to control this risk especially 
well, we should bolster other forms of regulation that do not rely on the 
threat of civil liability to create the incentives necessary for harm 
reduction. 
 
 95  Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 79, at 19; see Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability 
Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121 (2003). 
 96  KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 67, at 221; accord Boardman, supra note 92, at 786–87. 
 97  KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 67, at 221. 
 98  See Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12 DUKE 
ENVT’L L. & POL’Y F. 293 (2002). 
 99  Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer C, supra note 84; Telephone Interview with 
Commercial Insurer D, supra note 44. Liability insurance tends to follow an “underwriting cycle” 
in which “premiums and restrictions on coverage . . . rise and fall as insurers tighten their 
standards in response to the loss of capital”—called a “hard market”—“or, alternately, loosen their 
standards in order to maintain or grow market share when new capital enters the market”—a 
“soft market.” See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW 
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 55 (2010). 
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1. Improving insurance. 
This section considers two commonplace insurance devices that 
might allow insurers to gauge the risk of wrongful convictions more 
accurately: feature rating (rather than experience rating) and claims-
made coverage (rather than occurrence-based coverage). 
a. Experience rating vs. feature rating 
Insurers use two principal techniques to tailor rates for their 
policyholders: experience rating and feature rating.100 Experience rating 
uses the insured’s history of past losses—its “loss experience”—during 
some designated period (say, five years) to calculate current premiums. 
Feature rating instead relies on the insured’s individual risk 
characteristics. (Experience rating might raise Richard’s auto premium 
because Richard had an accident last year; feature rating because 
Richard is only nineteen years old and young drivers are accident-
prone.) Because wrongful convictions are a low-probability, long-tail 
risk, insurers lack the experience base necessary to do experience 
rating well. 
As far as I can tell, however, insurers are not feature rating based 
on the risk characteristics known to affect the likelihood of wrongful 
convictions. For example, insurers could—but, to my knowledge, do 
not—raise rates for agencies that fail to videotape interrogations (to 
help avoid false or coerced confessions) or use double-blind lineup 
procedures (to reduce the danger of erroneous eyewitness 
identifications).101 To facilitate reform, insurance regulators could work 
with state attorneys general or other law enforcement experts to devise 
a list of risk-related features that underwriters should (or must) 
consider when setting rates. Insurers might combine a feature-rating 
approach with “sub-limits” capping the amount of coverage available 
for wrongful conviction claims, which alerts the insured municipalities 
to the gravity of the perceived risk. 
b. Occurrence vs. claims-made coverage 
Even feature-rated premiums, however, may not be accurate 
enough to encourage optimal loss prevention and ensure insurer 
stability. There is an additional, somewhat more drastic step insurers 
might take. I have assumed, so far, that police liability coverage is 
 
 100  For descriptions of the two approaches, see ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 71–74. 
 101  See Garrett, supra note 21, at 103–04 (discussing these and other reforms to reduce the 
risk of wrongful convictions). 
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offered, as has been the general (though not exclusive) tradition, on an 
occurrence basis.102 “Occurrence policies cover liability for activities 
that take place during the policy period, regardless of when a suit that 
seeks to impose liability for these activities is filed.”103 Policyholders 
tend to like this feature, but it makes pricing very difficult, especially 
for long-tail risks. Pricing occurrence coverage requires insurers “to 
charge in the present for all the eventual results of present 
activities.”104 The principal alternative form of liability coverage is the 
claims-made policy. “[C]laims-made policies insure against liability for 
claims that are filed during the policy year” that arise out of activities 
occurring after a specified retroactive date.105 That is, a “claims-made 
policy provides coverage during the policy year for injuries caused by 
activities occurring in the past.”106 And “[b]ecause the insurer need not 
predict long-term claim exposure, claims-made policies can be priced 
more confidently than occurrence policies.”107 In fact, claims-made 
policies were first introduced when “concern over the difficulty of 
predicting the scope of long-tail liabilities became pronounced.”108 
More accurate pricing, while generally beneficial, may not 
translate straightforwardly into better loss prevention. “Although the 
shift from occurrence to claims-made coverage solves many of the 
insurance industry’s prediction problems,” Kenneth Abraham explains, 
“it does little to remove the obstacles to thorough cost internalization. If 
anything, such a shift may be a step in the opposite direction.”109 This 
is because a “claims-made premium increase reflects only the 
additional costs anticipated this year as a result of past activities,” 
 
 102   A 1991 study reported that 61.6% of law enforcement liability policies were occurrence-
based. ICMA & WYATT CO., LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS LIABILITY INSURANCE: CURRENT 
STATUS—1991, at 6 (1991). A more recent publication states that claims-made forms are now more 
common, but the basis for this assertion is not made plain. See ALBERT P. AMATO, REINSURANCE 
REFERENCE GUIDE 117 (2012).   
 103  ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 49–50. 
 104  Id. at 50. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. 
 108  KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 622 (5th ed. 2010); see also Jaap 
Spier, Long Tail (Liability) Risks and Claims Made Policies, 23 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 
152 (1998). More generally, claims-made policies work well to reduce the problem of insuring 
correlated risk. See Doherty & Dionne, supra note 63, at 198; see also Neil A. Doherty, The Design 
of Insurance Contracts When Liability Rules Are Unstable, 58 J. RISK & INS. 227 (1991). Municipal 
risk pools, which are essentially small mutual insurers, may have less need to use a claims-made 
policy, as the mutual form may accomplish similar objectives. See Doherty & Dionne, supra note 
63, at 196–97. 
 109  ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 50. 
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which “can send incomplete and imprecise messages to insureds.”110 
Abraham continues: “In contrast, an increase in occurrence premiums 
is a message about the future costs of this year’s activities.”111 The fear 
is that “a claims-made pricing system may induce an enterprise to 
underestimate the cost of prospective liability as compared to the cost 
of an investment in loss prevention that would avoid some of that 
liability.”112 
That is not to say, of course, that a claims-made insured is without 
any incentive for careful behavior—it is “always at risk that its 
coverage will not be renewed because of unsafe operations, and that it 
will be exposed thereafter to claims that have not yet been reported.”113 
In any event, and despite the drawback just mentioned, the gains from 
more accurate pricing may justify a shift to claims-made coverage. In 
particular, insurers could segregate coverage for wrongful conviction 
claims and write that portion alone on a claims-made basis, continuing 
to write the rest of the police liability policy on an occurrence basis if 
the municipality prefers.114 
2. Complementing insurance. 
Even were insurers to adopt all of my proposals, I would remain 
skeptical about just how well they could regulate the risk of wrongful 
convictions. There is a need here for a more active government 
presence—a vessel into which we might funnel some of the reform 
efforts presently focused on the use of force.115 Fortunately, as I 
mentioned in passing above, we know a fair amount about a set of 
policies with promise to reduce the risk of wrongful convictions.116 
There are numerous ways to encourage adoption of these policies. Old-
fashioned political lobbying has more promise than one might think; 
 
 110  Id.; see also Katzman, supra note 69, at 88 (asserting that, under claims-made policies, 
“current premiums are not easily affected by current risk management practices”). 
 111  ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 50. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. at 51. 
 114  See Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 44; cf. Katzman, supra 
note 69, at 87 (describing how environmental impairment liability is excluded from occurrence-
based general liability policies and written separately on a claims-made basis). 
 115  See Lempert, supra note 82, at 385 (arguing that government planning and regulation is 
necessary to control low-probability, high-consequence events). 
 116   See, e.g., GOULD ET AL., supra note 59, at 97–101; INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE & 
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SUMMIT ON WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS: BUILDING A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO PREVENT WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (2013), 
http: //www.innocenceproject.org /files/imported/wrongful_ 
convictions_summit_report_2013.pdf [https: //perma.cc /Y3NW-HTTF]; Garrett, supra note 21, at 
103–06 (detailing reforms and describing them as “inexpensive and easy to adopt”). 
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states have gradually adopted meaningful reforms concerning 
interrogation, eyewitness lineups, and other critical stages of the 
criminal process.117 Reorienting some of our constitutional criminal 
procedure doctrine from individual to systemic issues—that is, making 
a criminal defendant’s constitutional claim turn in part on the systemic 
measures the prosecuting jurisdiction has taken to safeguard the 
underlying constitutional principle—is one way to support and foster 
these political reforms.118 Another might be Congress’ spending power. 
Congress could reduce federal law enforcement funding to jurisdictions 
that have not yet implemented best practices to prevent wrongful 
convictions;119 in theory, the moneys not disbursed could even pour into 
a fund to help compensate exonerees. Nor should we stop with the basic 
set of established reform proposals. Why not take a page from the 
financial-crisis literature and try to develop an early warning system to 
anticipate wrongful convictions and mitigate the damage from them?120 
If insurers substantially improve their ability to reduce the risk of 
wrongful convictions, these public regulatory mechanisms may recede 
in importance. But until that time, the case for intensified government 
intervention is strong. 
IV. LOW-DOLLAR, SHORT-TAIL 
Low-dollar, short-tail claims are the bread and butter of 
constitutional criminal procedure litigation. That is, many 
constitutional violations in the criminal process cause some immediate 
harm, but not one the legal system deems compensable to any 
significant extent.121 This is because deprivation of a constitutional 
 
 117  See Rappaport, supra note 8, at 252–54. 
 118  See generally id. 
 119  Cf. Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using 
Congressional Spending Power To Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351 (2011). 
 120   See, e.g., Matthieu Bussière & Marcel Fratzscher, Low Probability, High Impact: Policy 
Making and Extreme Events, 30 J. POL’Y MODELING 111 (2008). To some extent, we see this 
occasionally already. See, e.g., Jess Bidgood, Massachusetts Justices Clear Way for New Trials in 
Cases Chemist May Have Tainted, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2015, at A11 (describing decision to allow 
thousands of defendants whose cases may have been tainted by a state chemist’s work to seek new 
trials); Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Hard Calls Face Ryan in Death Row Review, CHI. TRIB., 
Mar. 5, 2002 (describing the Illinois governor’s pledge to review the cases of all 159 death row 
inmates due partly to concerns about wrongful convictions stemming from systemic flaws). 
 121  See RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 337 (3d ed. 2016) (“The typical Fourth Amendment case—say, a gratuitous frisk or car 
search—does not involve the kind of physical injury or property damage that would translate into 
significant money damages . . . .”). 
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right, in itself, is compensable only by nominal damages.122 To exceed 
nominal damages, a plaintiff must demonstrate some separate, 
compensable harm, like a physical injury or loss of wages.123 Many 
plaintiffs cannot make this showing. 
Consider some familiar examples. Even a brief investigatory stop, 
especially if accompanied by a frisk, may intrude significantly on 
privacy and dignity interests the Fourth Amendment is said to 
protect.124 Where the stop is not justified by reasonable suspicion, the 
Constitution forbids it.125 Yet no damages are due for an unjustified 
stop, without more. Similarly, a “bare” Miranda violation—the failure 
to give Miranda warnings before conducting a custodial interrogation—
is not compensable at all.126 
What this means is that insurers have little reason to fear paying 
out on claims stemming from such mine-run violations, and thus little 
incentive to expend resources to prevent them. Three additional facts 
bolster this conclusion. First, although attorney fees provisions of the 
federal civil rights statutes were enacted partly to overcome plaintiffs’ 
financial disincentives to suit,127 fees are likely to be paltry—or even 
waived in settlement—when a plaintiff recovers only nominal 
 
 122  See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (holding that 
“damages based on the abstract ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights are not a 
permissible element of compensatory damages”). 
 123  Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248, 263–67 (1978) (holding that, “in the absence of proof of 
actual injury. . . only nominal damages” are due for a procedural due process violation). 
 124   See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989) (stating that “the 
[Fourth] Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain 
arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction”). 
Ironically, in the very decision that condoned the stop-and-frisk maneuver, laying the groundwork 
for controversial “order maintenance” policing programs, the Supreme Court articulated quite 
sharply the personal harms a frisk inflicts: 
[I]t is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful 
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an 
attempt to find weapons is not a “search.” Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that 
such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, 
perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a “petty indignity.” It is a serious 
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse 
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968) (footnote omitted). 
 125  Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–22. 
 126  Technically, a Miranda violation is not itself a constitutional violation. See Chavez v. 
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). But even if it were, it is hard to see why damages would be more 
than nominal. 
 127  See Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public 
Interest Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 239–41 (1984). 
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damages.128 Second, although, in theory, defense costs in suits for 
injunctive relief could be substantial enough to justify insurer loss-
prevention efforts, standing doctrine makes it extremely difficult for 
plaintiffs to seek injunctions.129 Moreover, many police liability policies 
cover only damages claims.130 And third, some—maybe many—policies 
contain a deductible or self-insured retention that effectively allocates 
to the municipality losses for claims below a specified attachment 
point.131 An occasional Terry claim resulting in a modest damages 
payment may never even touch the insurer. 
Insurers do not disregard these claims entirely. Some insurers—
especially municipal risk pools, which are owned by their policy-holding 
member municipalities—see one of their roles as promoting police 
professionalism. Reducing the number of Terry or Miranda violations 
could support this goal.132 And where a plaintiff is able to make a 
lawsuit financially viable—such as by obtaining pro bono 
representation by an interested organization—defense costs might be 
substantial even where damages are not. Perhaps most important, 
“everyday” violations, even if not themselves compensable, may ground 
claims of more egregious conduct that are compensable. Although a 
brief (unlawful) Terry stop, for example, likely causes no compensable 
harm, a prolonged one, or one accompanied by abusive language or 
conduct, might. Insurers thus have some incentive to make sure their 
agencies are generally following Terry. Similarly, although a bare 
Miranda violation is non-compensable, it may help support a 
compensable claim of outrageous conduct that violates due process.133 
 
 128  See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114–15 (1992) (holding that, when recovery of damages 
is the purpose of a suit, the fee award should depend on “the amount of damages awarded as 
compared to the amount sought,” and that plaintiffs who seek compensatory damages but receive 
only nominal damages “often” should receive “no attorney’s fees at all” (quoting City of Riverside v. 
Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 585 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment))). Notwithstanding Farrar, “there 
are circumstances where a judgment of nominal damages will support an award of attorneys’ fees, 
based on the vindication of important constitutional rights.” MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE 
MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION 974 (3d ed. 2015). Even so, defendants are permitted to 
condition settlement of civil rights cases on the waiver or reduction of attorney fees, which, by 
some accounts, has “destroyed section 1983 as a remedy for civil rights plaintiffs with only modest 
damages.” Reingold, supra note 3, at 4. 
 129   See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 
(1976); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). 
 130   See, e.g., Nat’l Cas. Co., supra note 17, at 2 (excluding from coverage “‘claim(s),’ demands, 
or actions seeking relief or redress in any form other than monetary damages”). 
 131   See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 41 (stressing 
importance of deductibles and self-insured retentions for effective risk management). 
 132   See, e.g., IND. MUN. INS. PROGRAM, supra note 24 (advertising police training videos 
covering Terry and Miranda). 
 133   See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 798–99 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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Still, at the end of the day, insurers will be hard-pressed to 
regulate closely an aspect of police conduct that does not, itself, 
threaten substantial civil liability. This describes a good deal of plain 
vanilla unlawful behavior. And if insurers do not regulate, someone 
else has to. For the most part, we rely on criminal defendants to act as 
private attorneys general by raising the claims in a defensive posture, 
in motions to suppress evidence.134 According to one study, ninety-five 
percent of Terry claims are litigated in this fashion.135 We supplement 
this with a tiny bit of injunctive litigation136 and a handful of “pattern 
or practice” suits by the U.S. Department of Justice under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14141.137 These are useful tools but they are probably insufficient, as 
they seem to leave us with underdeterrence, judging by the number of 
legal violations we presently experience.138 
As I have argued elsewhere, and alluded to above, in my view the 
biggest advance that can be made here, within the limits of practicality, 
is to reorient some of our constitutional doctrine to focus defendants’ 
claims on systemic rather than (or in addition to) individual issues.139 
The courts in this model would not be first-order regulators, 
announcing conduct rules for cops on the street to follow, but second-
order regulators, articulating constitutional principles for political 
policymakers to operationalize as they craft the conduct rules that 
govern the police. Suppression hearings would then focus not only on 
the isolated conduct of the individual officers alleged to have acted 
illegally, but also on the steps that policymakers took—both before and 
after the challenged conduct—to channel discretion and encourage law 
compliance. The basic theory is to address the systemic 
underdeterrence of police wrongdoing by having the courts pressure 
political actors to prevent and punish misconduct rather than try to 
catch it all themselves. I would not expect this systemic turn to 
eradicate the targeted misconduct, but I do think it could improve upon 
the status quo. 
 
 134  See generally Meltzer, supra note 14. 
 135  Leong, supra note 13, at 425. 
 136   See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 137  For a proposal on how to extract the greatest returns from the limited resources available 
for § 14141 litigation, see Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing 
Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 138   See, e.g., Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559–60 (finding that, during an eight-year period in 
New York City, “at least 200,000 stops were made without reasonable suspicion,” and “[t]he actual 
number of stops lacking reasonable suspicion was likely far higher”). 
 139   See generally Rappaport, supra note 8. 
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V. LOW-DOLLAR, LONG-TAIL 
As a doctrinal matter, the Constitution forbids racial profiling—
targeting an individual for suspicion of crime because of his race.140 
Payouts on profiling claims, however, while more than nominal, are 
typically insubstantial. In one recent case, for example, a Kashmiri 
man stopped at subway checkpoints twenty-one times by the New York 
City police settled for $10,001,141 a fraction of the deductible many 
insured municipalities carry.142 Other, similar examples are not hard to 
find.143 Although the media occasionally report high-dollar judgments 
and settlements in racial profiling cases, those cases always involve, as 
far as I can tell, some separate compensable harm from police violence 
or other aggravating conduct.144 As a result, despite substantial 
evidence of discrimination on the roadways and elsewhere,145 insurers 
have little incentive to expend resources combatting “mere” racial 
profiling.146 
As before, this is not to say that insurers pay no attention to racial 
profiling. Discrimination can factor into broader, more costly 
occurrences like the racially motivated use of force. In an effort to 
manage this risk, some insurers have begun to consider the racial and 
ethnic diversity of the police force at underwriting or rating.147 Others 
 
 140   See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (stating that “the Constitution 
prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race”). 
 141  Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Discontinuance at 2, Sultan v. Kelly, No. 09-CV-
00698 (RJD) (RER) (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2009). 
 142  Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 44 (asserting that $100,000 is 
a common self-insured retention among his company’s policyholders). 
 143   See, e.g., Settlement Agreement at 1–2, Md. State Conf. of NAACP Branches v. Md. State 
Police, No. FPS-98-1098 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2008) (agreeing to settle the claims of six plaintiffs for 
$300,000 total); Settlement Agreement at 7, Wilkins v. Md. State Police, No. MJG-93-468 (D. Md. 
Jan. 5, 1995) (settling the claims of four plaintiffs for $12,500 per plaintiff ); ACLU, ACLU of NJ 
Wins $775,000 for Victims of Racial Profiling by State Troopers (Jan. 13, 2003), 
https: //www.aclu.org /news/aclu-nj-wins-775000-victims-racial-profiling-state-troopers [https: // 
perma.cc /3ZDZ-URSF] (awarding majority of plaintiffs around $31,000 each). 
 144   See, e.g., Gousse v. City of Los Angeles, No. B174896, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2882 
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2007) (affirming trial court’s decision to grant a new trial on damages after 
a jury awarded $33,000,000 to a urological surgeon who claimed lost earning capacity, among 
other damages); ACLU, supra note 143 (reporting having settled claims of two plaintiffs who were 
beaten and held at gunpoint for $200,000 each). 
 145   See, e.g., THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, RESTORING A NATIONAL CONSENSUS: THE NEED 
TO END RACIAL PROFILING IN AMERICA (Mar. 2011), http: //www.civilrights.org /publications/ 
reports/racial-profiling2011/racial_profiling2011.pdf [https: //perma.cc /4EUN-JNWN] (collecting 
evidence); Ian Ayres, Racial Profiling in L.A.: The Numbers Don’t Lie, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008. 
 146  Recall that most policies do not cover defense against suits for declaratory and injunctive 
relief. See supra note 129. 
 147  Susan Kostro, Police Excessive Force Raises Liability Risk Scrutiny, IRONSHORE 
(Oct. 1, 2015), http: //www.ironshore.com/blog /police-excessive-force-raises-liability-risk-scrutiny 
[https: //perma.cc /RFP7-4PUG]. 
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encourage departments to train officers on confronting implicit racial 
bias.148 Still, racial profiling does not make the risk manager’s top-
twelve list of “high risk/critical tasks.”149 
One commonsense way to focus additional attention on racial 
profiling would be to lobby for loftier damages. Higher payouts would 
better reflect the dignitary harms racial profiling inflicts and create 
stronger financial incentives for municipalities—and their insurers—to 
beef up efforts to prevent profiling. This strategy would likely improve 
upon the status quo, yet substantial impediments to effective 
regulation-by-insurance would remain. One such impediment is that 
racial profiling claims frequently have longer tails than one might 
expect. 
To be sure, an individual who is profiled by the police might 
personally suspect (or even know) as much immediately. (The same is 
true, of course, of a wrongfully convicted defendant who knows he is 
innocent.) But from a risk management perspective, the more 
important question is when the individual can prove that he has been 
profiled, i.e., when he is likely to sue. And it turns out that racial 
profiling claims frequently lie dormant for years. Why? In all but the 
rarest cases that involve direct evidence of discriminatory intent,150 a 
colorable racial profiling claim must, to trigger Fourteenth Amendment 
protections, marshal statistical evidence from a broad sample of other 
incidents.151 This can make it impossible to prove that racial profiling is 
happening right when it first occurs—only situating the challenged 
conduct within the context of future (or future-disclosed) police 
activities will reveal its discriminatory nature. To reflect this reality, at 
least some courts have applied the “discovery rule” and held that a 
 
 148  Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 27; Telephone Interview with Risk Pool 
E, supra note 89. 
 149  GALLAGHER, supra note 19, at 52; see also GIROD, supra note 19, at 163 (declining to list 
racial profiling among fourteen “most common [types of] ‘actionable conduct’ involving civil rights 
liability” for police). 
 150   See, e.g., Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1168 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 151   See, e.g., id. (“In general, the absence of an overtly discriminatory policy or of direct 
evidence of police motivation results in most claims being based on statistical comparisons 
between the number of black or other minority Americans stopped or arrested and their 
percentage in some measure of the relevant population.”); David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights 
Cases to Reform Racially Biased Criminal Justice Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 109–
12 (2007) (“[W]here discrimination is sufficiently ‘clandestine and covert,’ statistical evidence of a 
discriminatory pattern is the ‘only available avenue of proof.’” (quoting Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977))); Brian L. Withrow & Jeffrey Doug Dailey, Racial 
Profiling Litigation: Current Status and Emerging Controversies, 28 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 122, 
130 (2012). Fourth Amendment doctrine regards discriminatory intent as irrelevant; as long as the 
police have sufficient cause to, say, pull over a vehicle, it matters not whether the driver’s race 
supplies their true motive for the stop. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
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racial profiling cause of action does not accrue until the injured party 
discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the basis for an 
actionable claim. The Third Circuit, for example, delayed accrual in one 
case for eleven years, until the State of New Jersey released documents 
revealing a statewide practice of racially selective law enforcement, 
“information vital to [the plaintiff ’s] selective-enforcement claim.”152 
More generally, there is an incentive for racial profiling claimants 
to delay pursuing their claims; many cases will gain strength as time 
passes and more data roll in. The incentive may well be the opposite in 
the use-of-force context: sue quickly while witnesses’ memories are 
fresh. In addition, both plaintiffs and courts routinely rely on data from 
outside the limitations period to inform the legality of more recent 
activity, which means that expiration of the statute of limitations does 
not signal the same degree of repose for insurers that it might in, say, 
the use-of-force setting.153 To put the point slightly differently, the 
factual and evidentiary basis for a racial profiling lawsuit may ripen for 
years without alerting insurers to the need to collect premiums and 
build reserves to cover any eventual payout. 
To give one example, the plaintiffs in a major racial profiling 
lawsuit in California—a class of individuals whom the police had 
stopped beginning in 1998—alleged that the California Highway Patrol 
(CHP) had “long relied upon race and ethnicity in conducting stops, 
detentions, interrogations and searches of motorists” as part of an 
“unabated, continuing pattern and practice of discrimination” that had 
intensified in recent years.154 The challenged conduct dated back to at 
least the late 1980s, when the CHP became involved in “Operation 
Pipeline,” a federally funded drug interdiction program the plaintiffs 
described as a “roving program of discrimination.”155 Yet the plaintiffs 
did not sue until 1999, the year California’s Joint Legislative Task 
Force on Government Oversight released a report, based on a review of 
thousands of CHP records, finding that Operation Pipeline 
discriminated against motorists of color.156 
 
 152   Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 153  See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558–60, 572 n.100, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (relying, in a lawsuit filed in 2008, on data and expert analysis reaching to January 2004, a 
state attorney general report from 1999, and evidence of “more than a decade” of institutional 
indifference); Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (certifying a class 
covering individuals stopped by police beginning in 2005); Complaint at 9–13, Floyd v. City of New 
York, No. 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2008) (connecting present-day allegations to 
history of police activity dating to the 1970s). 
 154   First Amended Complaint at 6, 16, Rodriguez v. Cal. Hwy. Patrol, No. 5:99-CV-20895-JF 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 1999). 
 155  Id. at 6–7. 
 156  Id. at 7. 
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Two implications follow. First, even if racial profiling triggered 
heavier damages, insurers would face substantial challenges in pricing 
and managing the risk. This is true for the reasons discussed in Part 
III—namely, that the long tail of liability heightens the degree of 
correlation among the covered risks, tempts insurers to externalize to 
the future, and creates uncertainty about the number and magnitude of 
claims insurers should anticipate.157 Consider, for example, the effects 
of a statute easing the burden of proof for racial profiling plaintiffs, 
which would buoy a large number of outstanding claims 
simultaneously, upending insurers’ financial planning. 
Second, criminal defendants are poorly situated to serve as private 
attorneys general, at least relative to how well they can play that role 
for claims with shorter tails. In many cases, present proof of 
discriminatory intent—through statistical analysis of prior incidents—
will simply be unavailable when the defendant is charged, even though 
proof may bubble up in patterns of future police activity. But even 
where present proof is theoretically available—and where defense 
resources exist to analyze and present it—pretrial detention creates 
strong incentives for defendants to resolve their cases as quickly as 
possible, sooner than will allow for the development of a relatively 
complex racial profiling claim.158 Stingy discovery standards further 
hamstring criminal defendants’ efforts to prove profiling.159 Indeed, I 
could find no criminal case in which a defendant has prevailed on a 
racial profiling defense under federal law.160 
 
 157   See supra pp. 386–92. 
 158  See, e.g., Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 13, 2015, at MM38. 
 159  See Armstrong v. United States, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (denying defendants discovery on 
selective prosecution claims unless they can show that the government declined to prosecute 
similarly situated suspects of other races). Courts are divided on whether (and how) the Armstrong 
standard applies in the selective enforcement (i.e., policing) context. See JODY FEDER, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL31130, RACIAL PROFILING: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 6–9 (2012). 
 160  My research uncovered no complete victories by criminal defendants based on racial 
profiling under either state or federal law. New Jersey courts have granted motions to suppress 
evidence based on state-law equal protection violations, though even these partial victories are 
rare. See, e.g., State v. Segars, 799 A.2d 541, 552 (N.J. 2002) (“This is a very unusual case. 
Without Officer Williams’s repudiated testimony, the evidence produced by Segars that Officer 
Williams saw him prior to the MDT check would have been completely inadequate to support an 
inference of discriminatory enforcement.”); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996); see 
also David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Redux, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 73, 77–79 (2003) 
(characterizing as unsurprising the “lack of litigation success in suits against racial profiling,” and 
crediting “unusual circumstances” for successes in Soto and a famous civil case); Lewis R. Katz, 
“Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the Fourth Amendment, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1413, 1427 
(2013) (“Only New Jersey courts have granted motions to suppress in Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection claims, based on their interpretation of the New Jersey Constitution.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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It appears, therefore, that neither civil plaintiffs—with liability 
filtered through insurance—nor criminal defendants, acting as private 
attorneys general, show much promise in the fight against racial 
profiling. A relatively small amount of injunctive-relief litigation has 
helped call attention to the problem, and may reduce the frequency of 
profiling in the targeted jurisdictions, but it seems unlikely to be a 
general solution.161 In light of these realities, it would be wise to shift 
our attention from the judicial forum to political ones. This is not a 
novel suggestion; the work is already underway. According to one 
report, thirty states have enacted some form of ban on racial profiling, 
and seventeen also forbid pretextual traffic stops. Eighteen require 
mandatory data collection for all stops and searches.162 The most recent 
efforts pin hope on cutting-edge reforms like implicit bias training 
(“debiasing”) and body-worn cameras.163 Increasing the diversity of 
police forces may help too.164 At the national level, federal policy 
 
 161   See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding part of a 
permanent injunction); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (entering a 
permanent injunction); see also Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. CV–01–1463–PHX–LOA, 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53315 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2006) (affirming a settlement agreement containing 
extensive prospective relief, including modifications to police procedures and training 
requirements); In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (similar). On the general 
difficulty of litigating racial profiling claims effectively, see DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE 
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 40 (1999); Albert W. Alschuler, Racial 
Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 245, 248; Harris, supra note 160, at 78; 
Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in America, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1069, 1069 n.394 (2011); Kami 
Chavis Simmons, Beginning To End Racial Profiling: Definitive Solutions to an Elusive Problem, 
18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 25, 37 (2011). 
 162  NAACP, BORN SUSPECT: STOP-AND-FRISK ABUSES AND THE CONTINUED FIGHT  
TO END RACIAL PROFILING IN AMERICA 19 (Sept. 2014), http: //action.naacp.org /page/-/ 
Criminal%20Justice/Born_Suspect_Report_final_web.pdf [https: //perma.cc /T54T-KVU2]. 
 163  Id. at Appx. II (listing, among essential components of an effective racial profiling law, 
“funds for periodically retraining officers and installing in-car video cameras, body-worn cameras, 
and gun cameras”); see L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons From Social 
Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2975–76 (2015) (describing the Fair and Impartial Policing 
program, which educates agencies about implicit bias); Robert J. Smith, Keynote Address, 
Reducing Racially Disparate Policing Outcomes: Is Implicit Bias Training the Answer?, 37 HAW. L. 
REV. 295, 300 (2015) (describing implicit bias training as an “ascendant idea in policing and 
scholarly circles” and providing citations); Implicit Bias, NAT’L INITIATIVE FOR BUILDING CMTY. 
TRUST & JUST., http: //trustandjustice.org /resources/intervention/implicit-bias [https: //perma.cc / 
T8XH-Y2A8] (last visited Dec. 19, 2015) (discussing implicit bias interventions and collecting 
academic research); Press Release, State of Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Kamala D. 
Harris Kicks Off First-of-its-Kind Law Enforcement Training on Implicit Bias & Procedural 
Justice (Nov. 17, 2015), https: //oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-
kicks-first-its-kind-law-enforcement-training [https: //perma.cc /ZJ8T-XBM5]. 
 164   See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing and 
Arrests, 44 J.L. & ECON. 367, 371 & tbl. 2 (2001) (finding that “an increase in the number of white 
police is associated with more arrests of minorities but little change in white arrests,” while “an 
increase in minority officers is associated with more white arrests but not more minority arrests”); 
Joscha Legewi & Jeffrey Fagan, Group Threat, Police Officer Diversity and the Deadly Use of Force 
(Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14-512, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
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prohibits U.S. agents from profiling, although the policy has some 
loopholes, and efforts to enact broader, federal legislation have 
faltered.165 A recent report by the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing urges local agencies to adopt their own policies 
banning profiling.166 There is a supportive role for doctrine to play as 
well: The Court’s current, hands-off approach to stamping out 
discriminatory motive could become a sort of doctrinal carrot—a “safe 
harbor” available only to jurisdictions that have implemented adequate 
safeguards to prevent discrimination.167 
There is one major sticking point I have obscured, however: We 
have little idea which, if any, of these leading reform proposals actually 
work.168 While mustering political will to enact reforms is an important 
step toward change, there will be no change if the reforms enacted turn 
out to be ineffective. This field is ripe with opportunity for researchers 
who can figure out how to measure the effects of our “leading solutions” 
to the problem of racial profiling. 
 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2778692 (finding that a diverse police force reduces the influence of group 
threat, lowering the number of officer-involved killings of African Americans); see also LORIE 
FRIDELL ET AL., RACIALLY BIASED POLICING: A PRINCIPLED RESPONSE 68–78 (2008) (arguing that 
hiring a racially diverse police force can help reduce racial bias in policing); Robert J. Friedrich, 
Police Use of Force: Individuals, Situations, and Organizations, 452 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 82, 90 (1980) (finding that biracial teams of partners use less force). Overall, however, 
the empirical evidence regarding the performance effects of having a diverse police force is mixed. 
See David A. Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New 
Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1224–25, 1229, 1230 
(2006) (reviewing studies). 
 165  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION, OR GENDER IDENTITY (2014); see also NAACP, supra note 162, at 18–19 (describing 
repeated attempts to pass federal legislation); Letter from The Leadership Conference to Barack 
Obama, President of the U.S. (Feb. 24, 2015), http: //civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/Sign-On-Letter-Re-
DOJ-Guidance-Revisions.pdf [https: //perma.cc /AR6Q-8EEH] (conveying the “serious concerns” of 
eighty public interest groups about the DOJ’s 2014 guidance). 
 166  PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S 
TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 28 (2015). 
 167  See Rappaport, supra note 8, at 269. 
 168  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 163, at 302 (noting that, despite the growing popularity of 
implicit bias training, when it comes to efficacy, “empirical support is lacking”); Jack Glaser, How 
to Reduce Racial Profiling, GREATER GOOD (May 28, 2015) http: //greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/ 
item/how_reduce_racial_profiling [https: //perma.cc /7UQW-T5ZA] (maintaining that, “to date, 
research has yet to uncover a straightforward method that can lastingly mitigate implicit biases” 
that result in racial profiling). 




To tame police misconduct, we must first understand the nature of 
the beast. Careful attention to the incentives of, and constraints on, 
some of the major players in policing reveals not one but many species 
of misconduct. These players include the constitutional rights-holders—
i.e., the victims of misconduct, on whom we rely to serve as private 
attorneys general—as well as the intermediary institutions, like 
insurers, that help operationalize the deterrent ambitions of our civil 
liability regime. Some misconduct inflicts harms the legal system 
compensates meaningfully; some inflicts harms that, even if 
normatively serious, the system leaves largely unremedied. Some legal 
injuries manifest immediately; others manifest only after significant 
delay. These distinctions make it unlikely that any one solution, or any 
single remedial regime, will work best to reduce police misconduct 
across the board. Given these truths, police reformers ought to start 
thinking like foxes rather than hedgehogs.169 
 
 
 169  See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX 1 (Henry Hardy ed., Princeton Univ. 
Press 2013) (1953) (“The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”). 
